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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Appellant believes that the facts as stated in his opening brief are 
accurate. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE 
APPELLANT'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WERE 
VIOLATED. 
Discussion 
The government argues that the lower court incorrectly ruled that the 
petitioner's due process rights were violated. The appellant's believes that the 
lower court correctly ruled that the petitioner's due process rights were violated, 
however, the lower court incorrectly ruled that the violation was not fatal to the 
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revocation process. The government incorrectly relies on two United States 
Supreme Court cases in an attempt to persuade this Court that a police officer can 
deprive the petitioner of his driver's license at the time of his arrest without due 
process considerations. 
Utah Courts have held that "the right to drive is a valuable right or privilege 
and it cannot be taken away without procedural due process." Ballard v. State. 
Motor Vehicle Div.. Licensing Dep't. 595 P.2d 1302, 1304 (Utah 1979). The 
Utah Supreme Court stated that an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way is 
at the very heart of procedural fairness. See In re Worthen. 926 P.2d 853, 876 
(Utah 1996). 
In this case the police officer revoked the petitioner's license at the time of 
the petitioner's arrest because the petitioner refused to submit to a breath test. The 
government acknowledges that the officer's actions violated the applicable statute. 
However, the government incorrectly argues that Mackey v. Montrym. 443 U.S. 1 
(1979), stands for the proposition that the officer's conduct was not a violation of 
due process. In Montrym. the United States Supreme Court held that a statute 
which allowed the suspension of a driver's license for refusing to submit to a 
breath test was not void on its face as violative of the Due Process Clause. The 
statute at issue in this case and the statute at issue in the Montrym case are nowhere 
near similar. The deprivation of the right to drive however, is the same. 
The government's reliance on the United States Supreme Court's holding in 
the Montrym case is misplaced. In the present case the statute states that if a 
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person has been placed under arrest for driving under the influence and then is 
requested to submit to a chemical test and refuses "a peace officer shall serve on 
the person, on behalf of the Driver License Division, immediate notice of the 
Driver License Division's intention to revoke the person's privilege or license to 
operate a motor vehicle. When the officer serves the immediate notice on behalf of 
the Driver License Division, he shall... issue a temporary license effective for 
only 29 days." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10(2). 
In Montrym. the statute at issue stated: 
[w]hoever operates a motor vehicle upon any [public] 
way . . . . shall be deemed to have consented to submit to 
a chemical test or analysis of his breath in the event that 
he is arrested for operating a motor vehicle while under 
the influence of intoxicating liquor.... If the person 
arrested refuses to submit to such test or analysis, after 
having been informed that his license . . . . to operate 
motor vehicles... in the commonwealth shall be 
suspended for a period of ninety days for such refusal, no 
such test or analysis shall be made, but the police officer 
before whom such refusal was made shall immediately 
prepare a written report of such refusal [, which]... shall 
be endorsed by a third person who shall have witnessed 
such refusal[,]... shall be sworn to under the penalties 
of perjury by the police officer before whom such refusal 
was made [,]... shall set forth the grounds for the 
officer's belief that the person arrested had been driving a 
motor vehicle . . . while under the influence of 
intoxicating liquor, and shall state that such person had 
refused to submit to a chemical test or analysis when 
requested by police officer to do so. Each such report 
shall be endorsed by the police chief... and shall be sent 
forthwith to the registrar. Upon receipt of such report, 
the registrar shall suspend any license or permit to 
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operate motor vehicles issued to such person . . . for a 
period of ninety days. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 90 § 
24(l)(f)(WestSupp. 1979). 
Mackey v. Montrym. 443 U.S. at 3. 
The statute in Montrym. allowed for suspension of the driver's license 
without a pre-suspension hearing. However, suspension was only allowed when 
many prerequisites had been met and demonstrated by the police officer to the 
Driver's License Division. The suspension was not allowed to be done by the 
police officer as the government argues is appropriate in this case. Instead, the 
suspension was only allowed after a report had been prepared by a police officer, 
and endorsed by a third person who was required to have witnessed the refusal, and 
sets forth the grounds for the officer's belief that the person arrested had been 
driving the motor vehicle under the influence. Other requirements are mandated 
and stated in the statute. Once the Driver's License Division receives the police 
report, with the appropriate documentation, the Driver's License Division 
(registrar) then acts suspending the license. The statute in Montrym. is a lot 
different from the statute at issue in this case. 
The government is correct that in Montrym. the Linked States Supreme 
Court allowed the suspension of a driver's license without a hearing, however, the 
government is incorrect in arguing that the Montrym case makes the holding in 
Bell v. Burson. 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971), inapplicable to this case. The Court in 
Bell v. Burson. held that licenses "are not to be taken away without that Due 
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Process required by the Fourteenth Amendment." The Court in the Montrym. case 
did not state that when you refuse to submit to a breathalyzer that the Due Process 
Clause no longer applies, instead, the Court stated that the process provided by the 
statute - when compared with the property right and taking into consideration the 
small duration of the penalty (only 90 days suspension), that due process was not 
violated. In this case there was no process followed by the officer and the 
suspension is for a period of one year. 
In this case the process was incredibly flawed, and was not statutorily 
mandated. There were no safeguards on the officer's actions and no police reports 
submitted for review with other officers as witnesses and their statements 
submitted also. The report was not submitted under penalty of perjury and there 
was no proof submitted that the petitioner was the person driving the vehicle. 
There was not any process at all provided to the petitioner. Instead, the petitioner 
was deprived of his driving privilege by the police officer at the time of his arrest 
without any meaningful procedural due process. This Court has said that 
"[procedural due process entails procedural requirements, notably notice and 
opportunity to be heard, which must be observed in order to have a valid 
proceeding affecting life, liberty, or property." In re N.H.B.. 777 P.2d 487,489 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). The Montrym case is not controlling in this case. 
The government also argues that Dixon v. Love. 431 U.S. 105 (1977), 
supports the roadside revocation of the petitioner's driver's license without due 
process that occurred in this case. In Dixon v. Love, the Supreme Court ruled that 
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an Illinois habitual offender statute which provided for suspension of a license 
without a preliminary hearing upon a showing by records that the driver's conduct 
met certain criteria was not in violation of the Due Process Clause. The criteria at 
issue in Dixon v. Love was that the driver had been repeatedly convicted of 
offenses against traffic laws indicating lack of ability to exercise ordinary and 
reasonable care in the safe operation of a vehicle. In essence, the statute at issue in 
Dixon v. Love allowed for the automatic suspension of a driver's license when a 
certain number of points were obtained against the license. The statue did provide 
for a hearing after the fact. 
The statute at issue in the case is nowhere similar to the statute at issue in 
that case although the right to drive is the same. In Dixon v. Love, the suspension 
only occurred after the prior driver's record had been investigated and verified. 
The Court found that the prior record was easily verified. The Court also 
determined that the risk of erroneous deprivation in the absence of a prior hearing 
is not great. The revocation decision was automatic and a matter of points and 
priors. Id- at 113. In this case a revocation decision would need to involve many 
factors the least of which consists of actual physical control and whether the 
petitioner was informed of the consequences of a refusal. See Ballard v. State of 
Utah. Motor Vehicle Division. 595 P.2d 1302 (Utah 1979)(to request a person to 
submit to a chemical test for alcohol a police officer must believe that the person 
was driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle); Lee v. Schwendiman. 
722 P.2d 766 (Utah 1986)(in order to revoke a driver's license for a refusal to 
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submit to a breath test only proper when the individual has been informed of 
consequences of failure to submit). Dixon v. Love does not apply to the facts of 
this case. 
The lower court correctly ruled that the petitioner's due process rights were 
violated. The facts of this case are that the officer did not issue the Appellant a 
temporary license and instead revoked the Appellant's license without any due 
process at all. The violation of the petitioner's due process rights should be fatal to 
the revocation process. 
II. THIS COURT SHOULD HOLD THAT THE VIOLATION OF 
THE STATUTE IS FATAL TO THE REVOCATION PROCESS. 
Discussion 
The government concedes that the actions of the police officer in this case 
violated Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10(2). Not only does the government believe 
that the violation of the statute was not fatal to the revocation process, the 
government believes that the remedy fashioned by the court was improper. The 
government proposes to this Court a remedy that would reduce the present court 
provided remedy and begin the year suspension at the time of the violation of the 
statute by the police officer. In essence, the government is asserting that there be 
no remedy at all for a violation of the statute. 
If this Court were to follow the government's request the issue would then 
be, why does the statute exist at all if there is no remedy for a violation of the 
statute? Instead of being a statute, the statute would become a resolution, a hope, a 
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mere request by the legislature that the Driver's License Division operate in a 
certain manner. Contrary to the government's reading of the statute, the statute 
mandates compliance as a prerequisite to a deprivation of driving privileges. 
The government's argument does not make sense especially when looking to 
this Court's prior treatment of violations of the statute at issue in this case. As 
stated in the Appellant's Opening Brief, this Court recently affirmed a lower 
court's holding finding a violation of this very same statute to be fatal to the 
revocation process. In Mabus v. Blackstock. 994 P.2d 1272 (Ut. App. 1999), the 
issue was the failure of the police officer to inform the petitioner of the officer's 
intent to revoke the petitioner's driver's license and the manner in which the 
petitioner could obtain a hearing as required in the same statute at issue here. The 
petitioner is requesting that this Court follow the outcome in Mabus and find that 
violation of the statute is fatal to the revocation process. As argued in Appellant's 
Opening Brief there needs to be a deterrent effect to officers to ensure that the 
statute is followed. The proper penalty should be that a violation of the statute is 
fatal to the revocation process. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, and for the reasons stated in Appellant's Opening 
Brief, the appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse the lower court as 
to the remedy it fashioned after correctly finding a Due Process violation. The 
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Appellant asks this Court to rule that the proper remedy is a finding that the 
violation of Appellant's statutory and due process rights by the police officer is 
fatal to the revocation process and any suspension of the Appellant's driver's 
license was improper. * -p_ 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED t h i s ^ ^ ^ day of August, 2001. 
^ ^ ^ ^ 
Benjamin A. Hamilton 
Attorney for Appellant/Cross-Appellee 
9 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I Benjamin A. Hamilton, hereby certify that I have caused to be hand 
delivered an original and T copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of 
Appeals, 450 South State, Fifth Floor, 140230, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230 
and ^ copies to the Attorney General's Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, P.O. Box 140854, this 1^ day of August, 
2001. 
Benjamin A. Hamilton 
